Quote: (Dwarf Supreme @ 12 Feb. 2009, 17:05 )
Quote: (Carrington @ 12 Feb. 2009, 11:32 )
Speaking of CAS, I was just reading a very interesting piece arguing that the decision to discontinue the Ju-87 was indicative of the German high command's insulation from reality
That and its obsolescence.
That's part of the issue.  The Stuka was obsolescent like the A-10 is now: slow, unglamorous, (relatively) easy pickings for high performance fighters. In reality, though, it did its job very well.
From "The German Luftwaffe: Stuka Versus Bomber Analysis," p.131 in
America's Defense Meltdown"However, far more importantly, the bombers’ funding was 25 times greater than
the Stukas’ – given that one bomber equaled the cost of five Stukas. This advantage
provided the bomber a funding advantage of 96 percent bombers to 4 percent Stukas.
It is also notable that the Germans produced 114,000 aircraft of all types. Despite
the failure of the German strategic campaigns (discussed below), this total included
25,000 bombers but only 4,900 Stukas. Had the investment made in multi-engine
bombers been transferred to Stukas, 125,000 Ju-87s would have resulted."
When you begin to talk about 125,000 Ju87s (or 49000 instead of 4900) you're talking about the 'obsolescence' of the Sherman vis-a-vis the Panther.  You're also talking about a very different operational situation in the desert or in Russia. Quantity has a quality all of its own.
A similar point might be made about the British investment in Lancasters (rather than, say, Typhoons).